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Abstract
This paper focuses on key external and internal challenges the European 
integration is facing. Three factors have to get particular attention, which are 
likely to influence the EU’s developments in the next and most probably crucial 
period of the integration.
Accelerated globalisation with increasingly contradictory developments and, 
more importantly, accompanied by highly controversial and dangerous national 
reactions (policy measures) does not exclude serious conflicts and collisions in the 
next period. Even the best informed and experienced strategic analysts, policy-
makers and decision-takers are unlikely to be prepared to successfully face the 
„triad” of challenges: complexity, interdependence and interdisciplinarity. In other 
words, global and European developments reveal a highly complex structure, the 
understanding and answering of which requires in-depth professional knowledge 
and socio-psychological empathy. Due to the rapidly increasing interdependence, 
substantially accelerated after the global crisis of 2008 and involving not only 
trade but almost all areas of economic activities (services, capital flows, monetary 
system) each „national” decision generates regional and/or global consequences, 
with repercussion on the decision-makers. Finally, the impact of political decisions 
does not remain within the direct political framework, but has economic, social, 
institutional, regional, psychological consequences as well. 
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Economic decisions have political and other interdisciplinary implications. 
Therefore, any impact study in advanced countries generally preceding 
decisions with serious consequences should not only be based on a narrow 
spectrum of the character of decision (political, economic, social, etc.), but 
include the potential (or likely) impacts on other areas as well. In addition, 
it cannot be excluded that any slowdown or temporary stop or reversal of 
the decades-long globalisation, produced by the nature of globalisation, its 
negative effects or accompanied or just reinforced by sluggish growth or a 
new economic and financial crisis, could result in a „grand turning point” in 
international relations.( Giuliani, Jean-Dominique (2018)
Second, most challenges have been accumulated in a period of lasting, 
even if not very strong, economic recovery following the global crisis. The 
last decade proved to be one of the (or the) longest period(s) of continuous 
growth in large part of the global economy and in the European Union 
as well. Unfortunately, the historically granted time has not been used to 
successfully manage the key external and internal challenges. The EU enters 
the next period of lower growth or even recession accompanied by financial 
turbulances (or even a new global financial crisis) and with a lot of other 
unmanaged issues. It is difficult to foresee how at least some basic challenges 
will be addressed in a less favourable macroeconomic environment.
Third, the coming elections into the European Parliament in May 2019 
have already diverted attention from the management of burning problems. 
Member States and politicians are focusing on the future party-based 
composition of the Parliament, and on the personal aspects of key positions 
in different organs of the EU, with special interest in the future president of 
the Commission. At the same time, many external and internal challenges 
continue and their management can hardly wait for the post-election period, 
the first months of which will again be covered by implementing personal 
(and member country) priorities. In a period characterised by accelerated 
speed, any loss of time may generate irreparable costs and fundamentally 
influence the future of the European integration.
In the following part of the paper, specific notes will be made on key 
areas of external and internal challenges, based on recent developments and 
potential consequences for the future of the EU.
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1. Key external challenges
1.1.From threat to practice: 
Trade protectionism of the US administration
Already in his electoral campaign, Trump could convince a substantial 
part of the US citizens that the huge American trade deficit cannot be 
sustained. Particularly, countries with enormous surplus in bilateral trade, 
such as China and Germany („evil countries”) have to be punished. He did 
not care about the causes of this deficit (outward investment and production 
by US companies, consequences of globalisation started by and with huge 
benefits for US firms, losing competitiveness of domestic US firms in an 
increasingly global competition, etc). Words were followed by deeds, when 
import duties were introduced on steel and aluminium products. Although 
in the first round the EU, Canada and Mexico were exempted and trade 
protectionism targeted mainly China, in June 2018 the same measures started 
to be applied in transatlantic trade as well. Simultanously, Trump introduced 
25 percent tariffs on 818 Chinese goods, including high-tech commodities 
in the value of USD 34 bn and further punitive steps have been announced. 
China’s reaction did not wait a minute, and a similar 25 per cent tariff was 
imposed on Chinese imports from the USA in the same value, including 
agricultural produces. Indeed, if this process continues, the largest trade war 
of the economic history seems to be unavoidable. Interestingly, not due to an 
economic crisis which always tends to introduce protectionist measures, but 
at the peak of the current economic cycle.
Concerning the European Union, the US duties on steel and aluminium 
products include 186 commodities, with a volume of USD 7.2 bn. The EU’s 
countermeasures affect 183 US products (in the value of USD 3.2 bn). If the 
American protectionist practice were continued and extended to much more 
EU products, not least on German cars, the already started trade war could 
easily get a qualitatively new dimension with unpredictable consequences and 
costs. Less attention was devoted to the potential and not less important impact 
of the relevant reduction of the corporate tax rate in the USA from 35 to 21 per 
cent. Since large (and some smaller) EU member countries have a corporate 
tax rate above 30 per cent, the US move can generate a global tax competition.
In a global and European economy with signs of slowing down and 
eventually heading for recession, the most disturbing factor is Trump’s 
unpredictability. Once he declares a full-fledged trade war, and a few days 
later invites the G7 countries to create the largest ever free trade zone of the 
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world. He wants to punish Germany for its huge export surplus, but does 
not realize that Germany is a member of the EU and trade policy cannot 
be directed just against one country of a free trade and customs union. (In 
addition, most of the „unwanted” BMW cars sold in the American market 
are manufactured in in the USA itself.) Then he offers Macron immediate 
free trade provided France leaves the European integration. The same for the 
United Kingdom, without realizing that as long as Brexit negotiations are 
not finished, there is no chance for such a deal.
Transatlantic relations have been burdened by three additional moves of 
the American president. First, strong and justified concerns were formulated 
by the European partners of NATO. Although most of them are likely to be 
eliminated during the last NATO summit, but the US requirement to raise 
NATO-related military expenditures to 2 per cent of the GDP is based on 
quantity rather than quality of defense. Second, the Trump-Putin meeting 
in Helsinki, a few days after the NATO summit did not contribute to higher 
reliability of the US president. Third, the US withdrawal from the Iran deal 
creates a new conflict zone. All other signatory countries of the nuclear 
deal with Iran (Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany) 
would like to keep the agreement alive. Contrary to the USA, all of them 
have substantial economic interests in Iran, both trade, energy supply and 
investments. However, due to potential retaliatory measures by the USA 
affecting European firms continuing economic relations with Iran, already 
several companies started to suspend or substantially reduce their activities 
(such as BMW, Total or the cancellation of flights by British Airways and Air 
France to Teheran). Much more concern is related to the potential impact of 
no-deal with Iran. Any (internal) destabilisation could lead to unpredictable 
responses of the Iranian government in the Middle East. In addition, massive 
migration waves based on domestic instability, social hardship or even 
military actions would not reach the USA, but certainly Europe. Therefore, 
based on security considerations, the EU – together with Russia and China – 
should do everything to avoid the cancellation of the Iran deal, despite 
potential retaliatory measures of the Trump administration.
Finally, Trump’s statement that “trade wars are good because they are 
easy to win” can already be confronted by recent economic repercussion on 
the US economy. As it is well known, trade wars do not have winners, only 
losers, on macroeconomic, social, company and consumer levels alike. US 
protectionism has led or in short time will be leading to higher domestic 
prices of all products containing steel and aluminium. In consequence, 
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higher consumer prices would mainly affect those US citizens who consider 
themselves the losers of globalisation, with stagnating or sometimes falling 
real income. In order to counteract declining income, many people switched 
from higher-priced US products to lower-priced imported goods. As costs 
of the protectionist policy hit low-income people over average, most of 
the losers who voted for Trump could deny support to the president. (It 
is another interesting question why low-income people see their saver in 
a multibillionaire enterpreneur.) In addition, US companies manufacturing 
higher-duty products in various countries (first of all in Canada, Mexico 
but also in China) will also be hit by the protectionist measures. Finally, the 
costs of countermeasures have to be compensated for. Due to higher Chinese 
duties on US agricultural products, already as a firs step, American farmers 
needed a USD 12 bn subsidy financed by the US budget, usually struggling 
with huge deficits (financed by treasury bonds purchased by foreigners). 
Moreover, US companies forced to or still expected to return to the US and 
starting production at home may also ask for subsidies, since their (price) 
competitiveness is less than granted even against imported commodities 
with higher tariffs imposed.
In a highly interdependent world, trade sanctions can easily spread to 
the financial markets, particularly if some retaliatory measures will not be 
directly trade-related. Although the massive selling of treasury bonds by 
the Chinese government (owing 6 percent of all treasury bonds) cannot be 
expected, because it would hit back to the Chinese economy as well, but 
devaluation of the national currency can partially absorb the negative effect 
of higher tariffs on exported goods. In fact, in the last months, the Chinese 
government let the yüan depreciate by 7 per cent against the US dollar.
1.2. Russia
In one area, the current leaders of the USA and Russia seem to share 
the same common goal: the weakening or even dismembering of the 
European integration. However, they use very different instruments. Trade 
protectionism and NATO-related uncertainties practiced by the USA are 
accompanied by cyber attacks, intervention into electoral campaigns in 
various EU member countries and special relations to (right-wing) extremist 
parties, EU-sceptic or even anti-EU governments supported by Russia. 
Some new member countries, such as Hungary, but also the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia belong to this group, let alone some Western Balkan countries 
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which are not yet EU members. In addition, not only energy-driven (North 
Stream 2) relations between Russia and Germany add to the uncertainties 
shared by several member countries. On the other hand, not least obeying 
continuous US pressure, the EU has prolonged economic sanctions against 
Russia imposed after the illegal annexation of Crimea in July 2014. The 
measures target the financial, energy and defence sectors, and limit the access 
of Russian state-owned financial institutions to the EU capital market as 
well as to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for oil 
production and exploration. In addition, a visa ban and asset freeze against 
155 Russian citizens remain in place. The prolongation of the economic 
sanctions was unanimously adopted in July 2018 for another six months 
and its suspension made dependent on the complete implementation of the 
Minsk Agreement between Russia, France and Germany in 2015. Despite 
the Russia-friendly attitude of some member countries (mainly the current 
Hungarian government), nobody dared to veto this measure, despite the fact 
that it is particularly the new member countries that suffer from the export 
ban and register huge trade deficits with Russia that could be reduced if their 
exports were not affected by the sanctions.1
It is likely that the sanctions in this case started to work. The mono-
structured Russian economy is struggling with growing problems, both 
technological and financial ones. The impact of sanctions has split the 
Russian elite between those who benefit from Western sanctions and those 
who suffer. According to some analysts, the split of the Russian elite may 
have profound consequences for Russia’s future. (Orlova, 2018) In addition, 
the proposal of the Russian government to increase the retirement age (from 
60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 60 for women) resulted in a rapid fall in 
Putin’s popularity. (Kolesnikov, 2018) It remains an open issue how Russia 
will react to this phenomenon – with more hostility and additional military 
moves in some nearby regions or with more openness to cooperation with the 
EU. For the EU, the overall picture gets more complicated by the growing 
competition between Russia and the USA as current and potential main 
energy suppliers to the continent (already functioning gas pipelines from 
Russia and potential liquid gas shipped from the USA).
1 Most new member countries suffer more from the sanctions against Russia than from 
US protectionism. In more detail see: András Inotai: How vulnerable? Export-oriented new 
member countries of the European Union and the spread of trade protectionism. Paper pre-
pared for the ASPEN Review Central Europe, to be published in the autumn of 2018.
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1.3. a strategic reappraisal of relations with China?
The new global (dis)order created by the Trump administration 
automatically nurtured the idea of forging a strategic partnership between the 
EU and China. Not only because the EU-China economic relations had been 
obviously strengthening over the last two decades, particularly after China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, but due to both sides’ high-level exposure 
to international trade. On the one hand, the US sanctions generate „second-
best” solutions and search for new markets for the EU and Chinese products. 
Part of them can be included into the rapidly increasing bilateral trade stream, 
while another need further liberalisation of world trade, including bilateral 
and regional free trade agreements. Thus, both parties are fundamentally 
interested in keeping global trade free from further protectionism and 
preserving or even strengthening the role of the WTO. On the other hand, 
the immediate answer of China to the widespread use of increased US tariffs 
on Chinese goods and introducing adequate countermeasures against US 
products improves the market access conditions for European companies, 
not least in the agricultural sector. Moreover, US withdrawal from the 
Paris Club on climate issues and other international obligations definitely 
enhanced the global responsibility of and cooperation possibilities between 
the EU and China. This situation helped create a common vision much 
beyond economic relations among two of the leading powers of the world.
However, a breakthrough still faces serious obstacles. The EU wants 
better market access to China, including investment rules (overcoming 
the current joint venture obligations), financial institutions and technology 
control. At the same time, growing anti-China attitude in the EU has to be 
successfully encountered, with particular reference to the massive buy-up of 
technology-intensive small- and medium-sized EU firms (mainly in Germany 
and Italy, but also in other member countries) by Chinese companies in order 
to get (illegal) access to new technologies. 
The last EU-China summit in mid-July 2018 in Beijing ended up with 
a joint statement summarized in 44 paragraphs.9European Commission, 
2018) Among the most important common priorities are: 
– reinforcing the global dimension of the partnership;
– consultations in foreign policy and international security issues in 
Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America;
– fostering an open world economy and the multilateral trading system 
within the WTO;
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– special attention to be paid to climate change and sustainable 
development (including Blue Partnership for the Oceans);
– development of clean energy systems;
– regional policy cooperation;
– connection of synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
and the EU’s investment projects in the framework of the Trans-European 
Transport Network.
Of special importance is the last priority, since a few years ago China set 
up a special cooperation framework consisting of 16 European countries (11 
EU members and 5 Western Balkan countries) and China as a key arm of the 
Belt and Road Initiative (or New Silk Road). For some time, there existed 
well or less justified concerns to what extent this project is embedded into 
the EU framework and is considering and accepting EU rules of the game 
(public procurement, local content, environmental and energy standards, 
etc.), and how much can it be used to undermine the EU’s (not always very 
strong) unity. The last high-level meeting during the Bulgarian Presidency 
of the European Council in June tends to support the view that China is 
first of all and definitely interested in a strong and deepening EU, as an 
indispensable player in a sustainable and stable multipolar global system in 
the next decades of the century. Therefore, the special importance of the 16+1 
initiative has been reduced and increasingly involved into and combined 
with similar EU efforts. In fact, unique synergy could be created if the East-
West-oriented Chinese project could be connected with the still missing 
third North-South corridor between the Baltics and the Mediterranean and 
incorporated into the Transeuropean Transport Network programme.
1.4. Short remarks on the future of competitiveness
Despite growing and regional political, economic and social problems 
and persisting uncertainties, the process and progress of digitalisation of our 
life seems to be unstoppable. Within a relatively short period, but certainly 
in the life of the current young generation, it will have a unique impact not 
only on the economy, but also on our everyday life, social behaviour and the 
functioning of societies and institutions. Some experts emphasise that, in 
fact, we are not heading towards the fourth industrial revolution (after the 
steam engine, electricity and computers), but much more towards the third 
histoical revolution of mankind (after the common language that enabled us 
to communicate and the alphabet that made the transfer of knowledge and 
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experience to the next generations possible). The consequences are not only 
enormous, but absolutely unpredictable and unmanageable at the moment. 
Full-fledged digitalisation could provide the current global GDP with 20 per 
cent of the current workforce. Even if digitalisation remains limited (due to 
partly unforeseeen technological barriers or widespread social resistance), 
its impact on the labour market will be unprecedented. Not only concerning 
the quantity of employment needed, but also with reference to the quality of 
labour and its sectoral (re)distribution. In 20 years (or less) the structure of 
the labour market demand will be very different from that of today. Several 
jobs will disappear, while completely new demand will appear. In order to 
create the adequate labour supply, already today the education in the primary 
schools should be guided by the future demand structure, which, at the 
moment, is mostly unknown. What education can, however, do is to prepare 
the young(est) generation(s) with basic knowledge which is indispensable 
to enter the labour market, including English (and other) language(s) and 
clever use of computer and other new technologies. Not less importantly, the 
adjustment capacity, including geographic and skill-related mobility has to be 
substantially increased, accompanied by openness, solidarity, cooperation and 
social cohesion. At present, in the best case we are at the very beginning of this 
process, let alone several movements and sometimes official politics in various 
EU member countries, evidently leading targeting the opposite direction.
In addition, we need much more than future demand-adjusted education, 
both formal and informal. Most probably, the next generation will have more 
free time (for the same income), which generates new demand for selected 
goods and mainly for services. The intelligent and cooperative spending of 
the additional available time is a huge challenge to the mankind. Also, a 
new distribution of income will be needed due to the decreasing number 
of jobs or jobs that can be performed outside the working place (mostly at 
home). The introduction of a basic income system may be one instrument, 
although, at the moment its impact on the potential labour force and entire 
societies cannot be unequivocally assessed. Finally, not only the structure of 
the labour market and the available “free” time will be changed, but, more 
importantly, also a large part of our current “value set”. How the human 
being will be facing, reacting to and, in a positive scenario, adapting and 
adjusted to this unique challenge is, at the moment, absolutely open.
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2. Unsolved and partly further pressing intra-EU challenges
2.1. Brexit
According to the originally set schedule, the Brexit deal should 
be finished on March 29th, 2019, preceded by the finishing of official 
negotiations in October 2018 and by the approval of the European Council’s 
meeting. Although some delay would not jeopardise the deal until the end of 
2018, national parliaments, including the current European Parliament have 
to vote on Brexit until March 2019. This process may be questioned by three 
factors: first, the mountain of still unsolved issues of Brexit in negotiations 
between the European Commission and the United Kingdom; second, by 
partly already foreseeable internal political developments in Britain; and, 
thirdly, the impact of the forthcoming election campaigns to the European 
Parliament, most probably at full steam at the moment of voting on Brexit.
The two-year track of Brexit negotiations made clear that the original 
idea of the British government was wishful thinking. It is Brussels that 
determines the conditions of exit and not the „cherry-picking” illusion of the 
United Kingdom. The manoeuvring room of the UK had become narrower 
by each negotiation round. Consequently, “soft Brexit” options seem to have 
today a very low probability as compared to “hard Brexit” or no Brexit at all. 
Practically, “anything could happen in the next half year”.(Donnelly, 2018)
As a last attempt, the White Paper prepared by Her Majesty’s Government 
on July 6th,2 proposes a mix of high-level integration in the single market for 
goods with greater British freedom in the areas of services and finance. It 
is clear, this proposal is a non-starter and would only prolong negotiations 
most probably running out of the original time schedule – without no visible 
outcome in the near future. At the same time, negative impacts of a potential 
Brexit are already increasingly perceived in the UK. In addition, no meaningful 
option has emerged concerning the future state of the border between Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, not only an economic and employment, but also a 
highly risky political and security issue. Also, the Scottish question remains 
unanswered. Moreover and more importantly for the outcome, there are the 
domestic political changes in the UK, with growing opposition to the current 
government and to Brexit. Although those who are against Brexit are not yet 
strong and united enough, Brexiters seem to have lost control of Brexit and 
2 HM Government: Statement from HM Government, Chequers, 06 July 2018.
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the Brexit camp of the government has been broken, signalised by the retreat 
of several ministers representing the “hard Brexit” line.
At the moment, four scenarios are on the table:
– Brexit goes ahead and membership will be finished on March 29th, 
2019. This needs the full support not only of the Tory Brexiters, but also the 
backing by part of the opposition. Cost-benefit sharing will largely depend 
on the extent to which Britain will remain a “rule-taker” in the new deal 
(and, as a precondition, agreement on the Irish problem).
– Brexit falls at Westminster leading to political and economic crisis 
with substantial negative impacts. General election in early 2019 may be the 
consequence leading to delaying Brexit. Even more, developments may end 
up in a new referendum on membership or non-membership in the EU.
– The “no deal scenario” extends the deadline of negotiations and may 
generate an overall crisis leading to new elections in the UK, a “reinvented” 
negotiation approach to the EU or to further referendum.
– Finally, the UK may decide to stay in the EU with far-reaching 
consequences for the (already changing) EU and a new United Kingdom 
giving up the already outdated idea and historical reminiscence of “global 
Britain” (indeed, “global Britain” would be even more lost as the consequence 
of Brexit than that of staying in the EU). (Major, 2018)
2.2. Still not stabilized Eurozone
Future will show to what extent the EU lost time and opportunity to 
stabilise and further deepen the Eurozone, including not only ongoing 
institutional and legal measures, but also a qualitative jump towards 
creating a fiscal union. In fact, the last year granted calmness and stability 
to the Eurozone, reinforced by overall growth in the member countries. The 
initiative of Macron to strengthen the Euro by establishing a special Eurozone 
budget and nominate a common finance minister for the Eurozone came at 
the right time. In addition, the Greek problem could be successfully managed 
(although not without serious economic, financial and psychological costs). 
Ongoing Brexit negotiations could have also contributed to the necessity of 
fostering the position of the common currency without any potential British 
move in the contrary direction. The Euro could enhance its stability in the 
international monetary system and experienced a substantial appreciation 
against the US dollar. Practically zero interest rate, at least on paper, promoted 
investment activities and public and private spending, accompanied by the 
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adverse impact on savings looking for profitable deposits (and creating a 
threat for the future stability of the system due to huge amount of „floating 
money” – not only in Europe but also worldwide). Finally, the attraction 
of the common currency was rapidly growing in some member countries, 
still outside the Euro area, such as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. In fact, 
Bulgaria has had a fixed exchange rate system since 1997 and could easily 
join the Eurozone. The Romanian government has announced putting on the 
table a detailed plan of joining the Eurozone as of December 2018. Also, the 
Croatian government declared to join the Eurozone in the next five years.
Unfortunately, this historically positive atmosphere, including any 
serious discussion on Macron’s approach, seems to be largely missed. The 
main obstacle is Germany in general and the German Chancellor Merkel, 
in particular. She clearly refused Macron’s plan and, as an interim solution, 
proposed to analyse the possibility of creating a special Eurozone budget 
within the overall budget of the EU. In addition, she swept away the idea 
of a common finance minister saying that he/she would miss two important 
competences: no special budget and no parliamentary control. Although 
Merkel is not alone with this argument in the Eurozone, it is more than 
surprising that Germany, by far the biggest winner of the common currency 
does not support the deepening of the monetary integration, which would be 
a key element of macroeconomic growth and the sustainability of export-
oriented pattern of the German economy. (Any return to national currencies 
or even a split between “strong” and “weak” Euro currencies would 
immediately appreciate the new German currency by 30 to 40 per cent, with 
disastrous impact on the German economy.) 
A less calmer or, most probably, a more stormy period for the Eurozone 
is approaching. It roots in the slowdown of economic growth, growing 
global (and mainly transatlantic) protectionism, but may also be generated 
by growing economic and political problems of Italy, a different magnitude 
than that of Greece a decade ago. In addition, the financial crisis of Turkey 
adds additional pressure, because some Eurozone banks have high exposure 
to credits provided to Turkey (not least Italian banks).
2.3. The never-ending (never-solved?) story of migration
After the shock events of 2015, and the EU deal with Turkey, migration 
pressure on the EU had been substantially weakened. The previously mostly 
used Western Balkan route has lost importance due to the fence built by the 
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Hungarian government, cooperation among transit countries, strict border 
control and, to an unknown portion, because of the inhuman treatment of 
asylum seekers and economic migrants. According to a recent report by 
Frontex, the number of illegal migration dropped the last year by 43 per cent 
to 73.500 persons. Simultaneously, there occurred a clear shift towards the 
Western Mediterranean basin, with doubling of migrants amounting to more 
than 23 000 persons. The Eastern Mediterranean basin reported just 4000 
migrants and the number of people arriving to the Italian coasts fell to 1900 
persons.3 Despite the calming down of the situation, but still facing medium-
term massive migration threats, the EU was unable to develop and even less, 
to implement a common migration policy. Some member countries blatantly 
denied to accept any migrant and participate in a common EU-level policy 
of redistribution. Public opinion and official politics in some major host 
countries, mainly in Italy (but also in Sweden, Malta and Germany) started 
to go to distance from previous practice. The new Italian government refused 
access to Italian territory of migrants arriving in various ships and made their 
acceptance dependent on a functioning redistribution scheme. Passangers of 
some ships were taken over by Spanish ports and also France was asked to 
jump into easing the situation. Growing anti-migrant attitude in Italy, partly 
due to the large number of migrants who arrived over several years and still 
remained here in the last years, is fed by government propaganda but also by 
the uneven burden sharing between Italy and the member countries (despite 
some, although late arrival of EU financial support). 
Although the refusal of accepting more (or any) migrants seems to bring 
together some European politicians (Italy and Hungary), their fundamental 
position is very different. Italy would be ready to stop migration, including 
new policy instruments (turning back migrant ships to Africa, a method 
successfully used by Australia more than a decade ago, when South East Asians 
wanted to enter the country). However, it considers the equitable distribution 
of migrants (and the respective financial costs) among the member countries 
as a key element of any agreement. However, such a clause will hardly be 
accepted by Hungary and the other Visegrád or other new member countries.
Time is running short for the EU and member country reactions as 
existing or just imagined migration have started to undermine the basic pillars 
of cooperation of the integration. Official anti-migration policies filled with 
hatred, discrimination and inhuman treatment further contaminate not only 
3 See https://www.euscoop.com/eu/2018/8/14/fortex-drop-migratory-flow-eu
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the minds and attitude of EU citizens in some countries, but also contradict the 
basic “European values”.  As a result, the reaction to migration could easily 
create a “multi-value” European Union, a much more dangerous development 
than a multi-speed Europe or a Europe of “concentric” (?) circles. 
The EU should urgently take concrete actions.4 First, the role of Frontex 
has to be fundamentally strengthened, and equipped with competences 
not only in defending the Mediterranean,  but also in sending back ships 
with illegal migrants to their departure point. Second, member countries 
not ready to participate in a common migration policy (both by accepting a 
certain number of legal migrants and contributing to the financial costs of the 
“migration architecture” of the EU) should be excluded from selected areas 
of the integration (from decision-making to budgetary financing). Third, as 
already agreed on and to be supported by the next multiannual financial 
framework (2021-2027), the EU will dispose of a substantial amount 
of money to develop cooperation with African countries able to control 
migration pressure. Obviously, this is an absolutely necessary investment, 
but only for the longer term and not without risks. Money made available to 
African governments in order to control borders and convince citizens to stay 
at home because their decent living standard can be guaranteed, including 
education, healthcare, employment and entrepreneurial activities, may only 
have fruits in the longer term. Border control seems to be easier but with 
methods hardly to be reconciled with European values, in other words, in 
cooperation with authoritarian regimes or just dictators. In this context, basic 
European values and similarly basic security needs contradict each other. In 
addition, even if medium- and long-term programs in Africa, continuously 
and efficiently financed by the EU budget, generate meaningful results, the 
attraction of Europe will remain strong for the foreseeable time, particularly 
for highly talented young Africans. Global communication facilities will 
keep on contributing to the “attraction capacity”.
Migration has characterised the entire history of mankind, without which 
the human being could not have survived. No doubt that international migration 
will remain or, even more, become a more dynamic factor of globalisation. 
Most of this process is likely to be regionally limited and not reaching Europe. 
However, the EU has to develop a comprehensive plan how to deal with the 
migration pressure. Not less important is, however, to deal with the already 
4 As a first step in this direction see: European Commission: Progress report on 
the implementation of the European Agenda on migration. Brussels, May 16, 2018, 
COM(2018) 301 final.
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visible negative impacts of anti-migration campaigns that not only produce 
hatred and fear in large segments in the society of selected member countries 
but blatantly contradict basic European (and human) values.
2.4. Unstopped rise of populism
Looking back to the situation in the summer of 2017 when my last 
year’s paper was prepared, one can state that populism and demagogy 
kept on rising not only in selected member countries, but were spreading 
to additional members previously rather resistant to such mentality. The 
enhanced intensity and geographic spread of populism is rooted in and 
nourished by several factors. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, less and less people are 
able to understand the complexity (let alone the interdependence and 
interdisciplinarity) of current events and developments. They need simplified 
or even falsified information in a few seconds. 
Inevitable (positive and negative) challenges of globalisation, unprecedented 
interdependence and accelerated time, let alone the combination of both of 
them, appear as threats, risks, dangers against which one has to defend himself. 
Populist politicians are always ready to explain “evil intentions” instead of 
preparing people for successful adjustment and forward-looking attitude. The 
ongoing propaganda of hatred against migrants in Hungary (which largely 
contributed to a two-third majority victory of the current government early 
April 2018) is an evident proof that such an approach works, even if there has 
not been any threat of migration or by alleged “terrorists”. 
Domestic economic, political and social difficulties, including the costs 
of crisis management have left deep wounds in some member countries with 
longer term psychological, mental and social consequences. The emergence 
of right-wing governments in several member countries definitely supports or 
just directly generates populist trends (Hungary, Poland, but also the Czech 
Republic and, most recently, Italy). In addition, even in countries with deeply-
rooted democratic traditions and strong democratic institutions, populism is 
advancing. Although a populist breakthrough could be successfully prevented 
in the national elections in several member countries, populist sentiment and 
activity did not disappear. The rise of populism in Germany (AfD) and in 
Sweden (just before elections) deserves particular attention. 
As an additional and dangerous phenomenon, populism in some of 
the new member countries has been coupled with the reemergence of old-
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fashioned nationalism. The roots partly go back to historical traumas (or just 
unfounded dreams and illusions). An important factor is the late perception 
of the consequences of political, social and economic transformation for 
which most citizens were not prepared. It is almost “normal”, that the 
psychological repercussions of the dramatic changes manifest themselves 
two or three decades after the fundamental political, legal, institutional and 
economic changes (see the telling example of the AfD in Germany). Rightly 
or wrongly perceived, “second-class membership” can also be added as an 
explanatory factor, even if in most cases perceived lagging behind is more 
connected with the inability of using opened up opportunities adequately, 
or of investing EU money in competitive sectors. Not less importantly, the 
consequences of “self-peripherisation” (or self-marginalisation) trends in 
some new member countries have to be taken into account.
Finally, the less than adequate role of the European institutions, 
including the activity of the Commission, has to be mentioned. Although 
the Commission initiated a process against Poland based on Article 7 of 
the Treaty, it will take a lot of time and the decision to suspend voting 
rights would need unanimity which – as everybody knows in advance – can 
hardly be reached. Also, the sanctioning of a clear breach of the EU basic 
values by any member country has been missing, although the suspension of 
financing several projects from the EU budget could have been a meaningful 
warning. Just the opposite happened, when large-scale fraud with EU 
funds (mismanaged public procurement, obvious overpricing and use of 
money for projects differing from the original contract) remained not only 
unpunished but, with the silent knowledge and sometimes even with support 
of the Brussels beaurocracy, ended up in the hands of corrupt politicians and 
entrepreneurs, several times with clear anti-EU attitude. At least, stopping the 
financial support to evidently anti-EU governments, which used massively 
EU money to create the economic background of the previously established 
political maffia, could have been rightly expected not only from the relevant 
institutions, but from the European taxpayers as well. 
The forthcoming elections to the European Parliament seem to become 
a real test to the current situation of the European integration. Even more, it 
could become a determining factor of the future evolution of the EU. If populist 
parties will be the winners, whatever party structure will be characterising the 
next European Parliament, the EU will be facing another and dramatic internal 
challenge. It is no exaggeration, that the very future of Europe is at stake.
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Contrary to the populist-nationalist propaganda based on widespread 
opposition to and revolt against current European institutions, while 
stressing the recreation of “strong nation-states” as the key success 
factor of the future of Europe, Europe definitely needs strong common 
institutions with open, solidarian and cooperative member countries. The 
number of the participating countries is open – both above or below the 
current 28 members. What will be decisive are openness to global and 
intra-EU developments, readiness to cooperate and ability to adjustment 
to inevitable and continuously arriving challenges. Are leading European 
politicians prepared? If not, even more important is to prepare our societies 
not only in order to survive in a rapidly changing global, regional and 
national environment, but to keep or even foster Europe’s place in the 
global setting for the next, and probably turbulent decades, as well.
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